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The Perils of Landsat from Grassroots to Globalization:
A Comprehensive Review of US Remote Sensing Law
with a Few Thoughts for the Future
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has made an important decision on the fate of the
Landsat system, the world's oldest, civilian land remote sensing system. The
Landsat heritage will be continued for the long-term, with the Operational Land
Imager ("OL") that will provide Landsat-like imaging. It will be integrated on
the first National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
("NPOESS") spacecraft scheduled for launch in 2009.' NPOESS is an
integrated US military-civilian environmental satellite program and its activities
are being further integrated into a complete, technologically advanced system by
sharing science and data with space and environmental monitoring agencies in
Europe and Japan. In the short-term, Landsat's future was grim until February 4,2
2005 when a Presidential decision was made to add funds to its FY2006 budget.
Like the heroine of an episodic silent film serial, the Landsat program has
been tied to the figurative railroad tracks a number of times in its tumultuous
history. Like that heroine, it has also been yanked from certain doom at the last
The author is Professor of Space Law and Remote Sensing Law and Director of the National
Remote Sensing and Space Law Center at the University of Mississippi School of Law. She is also
the Editor-in-Chief of The Journal of Space Law and was the recipient of the 2001 Women in
Aerospace Outstanding International Award. She is a member of the International Institute of
Space Law, the International Law Association, and the American Bar Association Forum on Air
and Space Law.
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Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Memorandum for
the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce Health and Human
Services, Transportation, Homeland Security; Administrators of EPA, NASA; Directors of OMB,
Central Intelligence, National Science Foundation; and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs 2 (Aug 13, 2004).
See US Dept of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, Press Release, PresidentBush ProposesIncrease in
USGS

Landsat

7

Funding for

FY

2006

(Feb

4,

2005),

available

online

at

<http://usirfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Feb/07-118738.html> (visited Feb 27, 2005).
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minute by a critically-timed intervention. The bureaucratic version of plucking
the heroine from the path of a rapidly approaching train has been to tap the
budgets of the many Federal agencies that rely heavily on Landsat data and
collect enough money to keep the program going. This administrative hatpassing did the job for a while and the program continued, until its next session
on the metaphorical tracks.
In the most recent crisis, the Senate had once again begun to brush off the
Federal funding fedora.3 Faced with the real possibility that the hat would
remain empty, however, alternate plans were also being made to shut the
program down.4 With the metaphorical train whistle becoming increasingly
closer and louder, the Presidential decision has once again whisked our heroine
to safety-for now.5
Three choices were available to meet the crisis. The first was to end the
Landsat program. This would have ignored the universally recognized value of
Landsat data to both the public and private sectors. The second option was a
multiple choice: a) privatize; b) commercialize; or c) establish joint interagency
operations. All of these were the wrong choices because they have all been
attempted and failed. The third choice was to do the only thing that has not
been done in thirty-three years: declare the Landsatprogram operational, give it a
permanent institutional home and budget and integrate it in the growing trend to
internationalize Earth observation satellite operations.6 The Presidential decision
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2005, S Rep No 108-341,
108th Cong, 2d Sess 30 (2004) ("In the Committee's view, if the decision is made to maintain
Landsat operations at the current level for the near future, then the various Federal agencies that
typically rely on Landsat data and want production continued should share in the cost of the
satellite's operations.").
Id. ("If... a clear plan regarding mission and funding options is not received by June 30, 2005,
the managers direct the Department of the Interior to submit a plan for shutdown of the Landsat
program.'). Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes, Conference
Report to Accompany HR 4818, HR Rep No 108-792, 108th Cong, 2d Sess 1053 (2004).
5
6

See US Dept of the Interior, PresidentBush ProposesIncrease (cited in note 2).
There are a number of important, long-term integrations of satellite systems occurring at the
national and international levels. In addition to NPOESS, they include the "system of systems"
being forged by fifty-three nations and the European Commission as the Group on Earth
Observations. See <http://earthobservations.org/> (visited Feb 20, 2005). Another is the Global
Monitoring of Environment and Security joint initiative of the European Commission and the
European Space Agency. It is designed to establish a European capacity for the provision and use
of operational information for Global Monitoring of Environment and Security. See
<http://www.gnes.info/> (visited Feb 20, 2005). These activities are premised on a variety of
international agreements, including the Charter on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use
of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or Technological Disasters (2000), available online at
<http://www.disasterscharter.org/charter-e.html> (visited Feb 18, 2005); the Agreement
between the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the European
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to ensure short-term operations along with the long-term integration of the OLI
into NPOESS comes closest to the third choice. US land remote sensing appears
to have stabilized for the foreseeable future. However, even with these decisions
made, it appears that there will be a data gap and there are still opportunities to
place Landsat-OLI on the metaphorical tracks yet again.
Therefore, the purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to strongly
state that the time has come for a long-term, stable, transparent, globalizationera approach for OLI, n6e Landsat. The second purpose is to provide a
comprehensive review of US remote sensing law and the environment in which
it evolved to provide an institutional memory for future actions.
The paper is in four parts. The first is this introduction. The second section
identifies some of the macro forces that have been at play in the evolution of the
Landsat program. In the third section, US land remote sensing is organized into
four eras according to the legal foundation that existed in each. Each era is
discussed in a brief synopsis followed by a description of its statutory
foundation. The fourth section offers some lessons learned and raises some
thoughts about the land remote sensing era that has just begun with the two
most recent decisions.
II. THE FORCES AT PLAY
The Landsat program was in need of rescue yet again because it has yet to
be institutionalized as a globalization era asset. To understand this, it is
important to appreciate a number of forces at play in the evolution of the
Landsatprogram.
A. NATIONAL-GLOBAL TENSION
First, Landsatis a national program with an inherently global function. That
is, it operates globally to meet national needs-gathering global crop forecasting
data for national markets and national security, for example. Additionally, the
program often needs the participation of international actors, like foreign ground
stations, for example, to meet national foreign policy and fiscal objectives. Or
put another way, the program is challenged to act globally while serving national
needs: an increasingly necessary and difficult objective.

Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites on an Initial Joint Polar-Orbiting
Operational System, Hein's No KAV 5546 (1998) (hereinafter IJPS Agreement); the Agreement
between the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites on Joint Transition Activities
Regarding Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems, Hein's No KAV 6207
(2003) (providing from transition from IJPS Agreement) (hereinafter JTA Agreement).
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B. COLD WAR ROOTS
A second force to appreciate is the lingering strength of Landsafs Cold War
origins. It was started for many of the same reasons that the US conducted the
Apollo program. Early interagency turf battles between the Department of the
Interior ("Dol") and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency ("NASA")
over the housing of Landsat was resolved in favor of NASA, the satellite agency.
The decision communicated the fact that while factors like agricultural and
forestry applications were important, Landsat, like Apollo, was also born of Cold
War necessities: to establish national prestige; influence nonaligned nations;
display the peaceful uses of space technology; and to demonstrate technological
superiority. One result of this has been a legal, policy and fiscal focus on the
satellites with little attention paid to the long-term value of the data they
generate. This is demonstrated by the fact that while Earth observations
satellites tend to be funded and debates about them occur at the highest level of
governmental policies and politics, the data generated by them has been little
addressed. Only with the advent of what was then called the Earth Observation

System Data and Information System ("EOSDIS") in the mid-1990s did data
activities taken on political import closer to that of the satellites Despite
surveys, testimonies, legislative and executive
decades
of studies,
pronouncements the focus has only just begun to shift from the on-orbit
hardware-a Cold War value, to include the data, a globalization era value.
C. POLITICALLY ESOTERIC
The third force to consider is that land remote sensing is politically
esoteric. To illustrate the point imagine walking down the halls of Congress on
any given day and randomly stopping the first five Senators or Representatives
that are encountered. If they are asked for their positions on social security
privatization, abortion, healthcare or gun control they will have a ready response.
If they are asked for their position on how to institutionalize Landsat, in all
probability, they will have no response. They will have no response because they
don't need to; their constituents do not require them to know about it. In a
nation of approximately 290 million people, the direct Landsat constituency, that
is, all the scientists, businesses, students, managers and administrators who use
the data in some form and know enough about Landsat to refer to its data by
name, is in the thousands, perhaps the low tens of thousands: hardly the number

Even so, the relative lack of priority for data activities is indicated by decisions that reduced the
proportion of EOSDIS funding from its original 60 percent of the entire Earth Observations
System mission to approximately 33 percent. General Accounting Office, Earth Observing System
FundingRequirementsforNASA's EOSDIS 2, GAO/AIMD-95-153FS (June 8, 1995).
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generally needed to get and keep political pressure. The result has been that a
critically important, federally-funded asset with national significance is controlled
by a handful of citizens and government officials engaged in interest-driven
politics. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act of 1984 ("Commercialization Act'), 8 its 1987
Amendments,9 and the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act ("Policy Act")'0 all
decline to codify a definite decision to institutionalize Landsat." Instead, they all
contain Congressional direction to government and industry actors that amounts
to telling them to work things out among themselves somehow and to do so
within guidelines that appear to change based on which group was able to exert
the most recent influence.
Contrasting Landsat with the weather satellites further illustrates that land
remote sensing is politically esoteric. It is important to note that through all four
eras, there have never been any attempts to commercialize the United States'
weather satellites. To the contrary, both the Commercialization Act 12 and the
Policy Act 3 unequivocally prohibit any commercialization of any portion of the
weather satellite systems. Further, they place constraints on future attempts to
commercialize them by first requiring that the sections prohibiting
commercialization be repealed before a new law allowing weather satellite
commercialization can be made. Every member of Congress has experienced
rain, snow, sleet and extreme weather. They understand it, and like all US
citizens, members of Congress like to see it coming. Therefore they are adamant
and clear about maintaining the weather satellites, in a stable funding
environment. To date, land remote sensing has not been understood in the same
way. Perhaps the "Landsat 7 images of tsunami damaged coastlines in the Indian
Ocean [that] are being used by relief organization [sic] to make practical, wellinformed decisions as to where their efforts are most urgently needed and how

8

15 USC § 4201 et seq (1984).

9

The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act Amendments of 1987, Pub L 100-147, 101
Stat 876 (1987), codified at 15 USC § 4221 et seq (1987).
15 USC 5 5601 et seq (1992).

10

12

In the remote sensing community, the two statutes discussed in this article are often referred to as
the "Landsat Act" and the "Landsat Policy Act." This article uses "Commercialization Act" and
"Policy Act" instead. These terms more accurately describe the laws' content and the
Congressional intent behind them. However, the commonly used shortened tites do demonstrate
the overwhelming importance that Landsat has had in US and international remote sensing
activities. The statutes intended, de jute, that Landsat was to be only one part of the nation's
overall public and private land remote sensing activities. Nonetheless, de facto, Landsathas always
been the metaphorical center of gravity for all of them.
15 USC §§ 4291-92.

13

15 USC

11

§§ 5671-72.
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best to carry out that work"'14 have begun to render land remote sensing less
esoteric.
D. FRENETIC, RELATIVELY Low-LEVEL ACTIVITY
A fourth, and critical force is the frenetic but relatively low-level political
activity that has always surrounded Landsat. Regardless of which agency has had
responsibility for Landsat,day-to-day program operations have always resided at
relatively low-levels of the Federal bureaucracy. Satellites are high value assets,
so Landsat does come to the attention of a handful of people at the apex of the
Federal bureaucracy-Senators, Agency Administrators, Cabinet Secretaries, the
Vice President, even the President on occasion-but typically, only when it is in
extreme crisis. They make a decision and the program is returned to its low level
niche. The result is low-level personnel well informed for the long-term, highlevel decisionmakers temporarily well informed for the short-term, and a vast
middle bureaucracy in need of education about the complexities of satellites,
sensor technologies, information technology, data, and applications.
III. THE FOUR ERAS OF US CIVILIAN LAND-REMOTE SENSING
Civilian land remote sensing in the United States can be divided into four
eras: 1972-83, 1984-92, 1992-2004, and the. current era, which has just begun
with the decisions to place the OLI on NPOESS and to stabilize Landsat for
FY2006. Each era can be characterized in legal, policy and political terms. Of
these, the law has had the most powerful influence forcing various competing
interests to organize, and reorganize themselves according to the different
statutes in force in each era. Governing statutes in three of the four eras codified
controlling policies and data pricing policies. The central issue in the first three
eras was how to institutionalize the Landsatsystem. In the second and third eras,
this issue was defined primarily in terms of whether Landsat should be in the
public sector or private sector. In era one, civilian land remote sensing was
conducted by the public sector, in era two by the private sector, and era three
partially by the private sector and partially by the public sector, with full return
to the public sector by the mid- to late-1990s.
It is important to note that while Landsat is a single land remote sensing
system, from 1972 to 2005 it has consisted of seven different satellites. Landsats
1,15 2, and 3 were era-one satellites; Landsats 4, 5 and 6 were era-two satellites

14

US Dept of the Interior, PresidentBush ProposesIncrease (cited in note 2).

15

Landsat 1 was originally named the Earth Resources Technology Satellite, ERTS 1. For all nations, the
name raised the specter of economic espionage, and for developing nations, colonial-era resource
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and Landsat 7 was, and is, an era-three satellite. Additionally, different satellites
were operated by different entities in both the public and private sectors. NASA
operated Landsats 1, 2 and 3. Landsats 4 and 5 were first operated by the
Department of Commerce ("DoC')/National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration ("NOAA"), and then by a private contractor, followed by the
DoI/United States Geological Survey ("USGS"). Landsat 6 was built and
launched by a private contractor but it failed to reach orbit upon launch. Landsat
7 was, at various times, the responsibility of NASA, the Department of Defense
("DoD"), NOAA and now, the DoI/USGS. These interagency changes required
regularly educating whole new organizations, not just about Landsat, but also
about the value of land remote sensing as a whole. So although data continuity
has been the major goal of the system, its components-individual satelliteswere governed by different policies and rules and operated by different entities,
contributing to Landsal's historically precarious situation.
A. ERA ONE: 1972-83
Shortly after Landsat I was launched, the United States Congress addressed
the complicated task of institutionalizing the Landsatsystem. From 1972 to 1983
more than twenty bills were introduced to make Landsat an operational system;
none of them left committee. 6 The House of Representatives and the Senate
held hearings in 1977, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1983. Despite the many
Congressional attempts to enact a law, the first era is characterized by a lack of a
comprehensive Federal statute governing land remote sensing.
Policy drivers were a mix of science, defense and foreign policy.
Commercialization was believed to be possible and although attempts were
made to define how it could be achieved, Congress did not set
commercialization as a specific goal in this period. In fact, it was Congress' early
view of Landsat as a hybrid public good, commercial, and foreign policy asset
that made the political will to reach agreement about an appropriate institutional
arrangement elusive, despite strong Congressional support to do so. In this era,
the Carter Administration transferred Landsat from NASA to NOAA with an
accompanying ten-year plan for eventual commercialization.17 Manifesting the
foreign policy value of Landsat,the LandsatGround Station Operations Working

exploitation by advanced nations. To demonstrate that this was not what the United States
intended and to assuage these fears, the satellite name was changed to Landsat 1.
Report of the House Committee on Science and Technology on the Land Remote-Sensing

16

Commercialization Act of 1984, HR Rep No 98-647, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (Apr 3, 1984).
17

Presidential Directive 54, Civil Operational Remote Sensing (Nov 16, 1979), available online at
(visited
<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pres_directive.phtml>
Feb 18, 2005).
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Group ("LGSOWG") was established. Ground station operators in foreign
nations were required to participate in LGSOWG as a condition of receiving
Landsat data. It was intended to be an information exchange forum on "remote
sensing problems and opportunities among nations operating LANDSAT data
acquisition and processing facilities."' 8
This era had an additional characteristic that has continued through all eras
and up to the current day: attempting cost recovery for satellite operations. Cost
recovery for satellite operations was identified as an early objective in the first
LGSOWG meeting in 1975. A presentation was made "on NASA's . . .
intentions with regard to establishing a fee system for participating stations in
the future so as to share in some measure the cost of the space segment . .. "9
Landsal's user community was small and emerging. The largest data user was the
US Federal Government. Attempts were made to encourage foreign countries,
Federal agencies and the private sector to use the data and find applications for
them in oil prospecting, agriculture, and forestry, among other uses. The
newness of Landsat technology, low-level computing power available at the time,
an inherent mistrust of satellites as a data source by some potential users, and
interagency turf battles made data adoption difficult. However, developing
nations showed interest quickly.
Finally, the most important principle in remote sensing law and policy was
established in this era: nondiscriminatory access. In era one, this meant that
access to Landsat data was unrestricted. It was available to all who requested it.
Foreign ground stations that wanted to download Landsatdata also had to agree
to practice nondiscriminatory access. 20 The principle is rooted in the US
philosophies favoring open information societies and demonstrating the
peaceful uses of space technology. 2' It was the application of this principle in a
new context that gave rise to the complicated conflicts of era two.
18

NASA, Minutes of the Landsat Ground Station Operations Working Group Meeting 1 (June 1,
1975) (on file with author).

19
20

Id at 5.
See, for example, Memorandum of Understanding between the National Space Development

21

Agency of Japan and the United States Department of Commerce National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration § II(B)(3), 35 UST 2177 (1983); Memorandum of Understanding
between the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the United States
Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration S I(B)(3), 35 UST
2359 (1983). Under these Memoranda, Japanese and South African ground stations are required
to "[e]nsure that all Landsat data acquired and archived by the NASDA ground station are
available for sale or distribution on a public, non-discriminatory basis. This applies to all Landsat
data acquired under this agreement, as well as Landsat data acquired under previous Memoranda
of Understanding with NASA." See id.
See United States Space Activties, Announcement of Administration Review, 14 Weekly Comp Pres Doc
1135 (June 20, 1978); Operational Remote Sensing Legislation, Hearings on S 663 and S 875
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B. ERA Two: 1984-92
1. Synopsis
The era two political environment included a strong Republican President
and a Democratic Congress which often felt it was reduced to damage control in
its legislative agenda. A hallmark of the Reagan Administration was the avid
promotion of the private sector's influence with a corresponding attempt to
decrease the influence of the public sector. A major goal in presidential politics
was to separate the functions of the public and private sectors and to place as
many publicly conducted functions as possible in the private sector.
Commercialization and privatization were the driving forces of the political
scene and space activities were no exception. In a single Congressional session,
three major legislative moves were made. The National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 was amended to include promoting commercial space as part of
NASA's mission," and both the Commercial Space Launch Act23 and the
Commercialization Act were passed.24 The first part of the Commercialization
Act almost exclusively characterized era two remote sensing. Although the Act
intended a three-phased approach to commercialization, activities never
progressed beyond the first phase.
In the case of the Commercialization Act, Congress was moved to action
by a March 1983 DoC request for proposals ("RFP") to commercialize the
Landsat system and the weather satellites. 25 Despite the numerous failed era one
attempts to enact a remote sensing statute, Congress was prompted by a desire
to assert its constitutional authority26 and it passed the Commercialization Act in
only four months. An intense competitive process followed in which all but one
bidder dropped out after they learned that Congress would prohibit the

22

before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong, 1st Sess I4, 243-44 (1979) (statements of Senators Stevenson and Schmitt).
42 USC § 2451(c) (2005).

23

49 USC § 70101-05 (1988) (incorporating Act and its amendments into transportation law).

24

15 USC §§ 4201-92.

25

Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, Hearings on HR 4836 and HR 5155

26

before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment and the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science and
Technology, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1984).
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Commercializafion of Land and Weather
Satellites, Report for the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications and the Subcommittee
on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment of the House Committee on
Science and Technology, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 20 (1983).

Sammer 2005

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

commercialization of the weather satellites." All but the sole remaining bidder
required the revenue the weather satellites would generate to subsidize Landsat
operations. This view was consistent with advice from the Office of Technology
Assessment ("OTA'). 28 The contract went to "last person standing" against
both OTA's advice to Congress and industry assessment.
The Landsat system was only the starting point for Congress'
commercialization plans. The Commercialization Act also addressed licensing
private remote sensing systems; research and development; and prohibited
commercializing the national weather satellites. The DoC was given primary
authority for implementing the law. The Departments of Defense and State were
responsible for overseeing national security and international obligations raised
by the Act.
The Federal Government and the Earth Observations Satellite Corporation
("EOSAT") 9 entered into a ten year contract.30 EOSAT took over operations of
Landsats 4 and 5; built and unsuccessfully launched Landsat 6; and replaced the
government in LGSOWG. It was also responsible for research, development
and initial data archiving. EOSAT was bound by a broad application of the
nondiscriminatory access policy, which required making the data available to all
who requested it. However, the company interpreted that to mean it had to
charge the same price for all users turning nondiscriminatory access into
nondiscriminatory pricing. The practical result was the same high prices were
charged to all. The per image price rose from hundreds to thousands of dollars,
virtually eliminating start-up value added companies, academia and developing
nations as users. At the same time, the broad definition of nondiscriminatory
access had a chilling effect on other companies that may have wanted to enter
the market and EOSAT remained the only US commercial satellite data provider
of the era. The Federal Government continued to be the largest user of Landsat
data. All of these factors combined to create a federally-subsidized monopoly.

27

The bidding process is yet another story within the Landsat story worthy of its own, independent
case study. It is a series of promises made and broken by the Government and industry bluffing.

28

"Until the market expands substantially, and more efficient spacecraft are developed and
deployed, it could cost the Federal Government as much to subsidize a private owner as to
continue operating the system itself." US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote
Sensing and the Private Sector Issuesfor Discussion:A TechnicalMemorandum 3 (Mar 1984).

29

EOSAT no longer exists. After the failure of Landsat 6, it merged with SpaceImaging, which for a

30

short while was known as Spacelmaging-EOSAT. "EOSAT" was dropped from the name shortly
thereafter. As this is written, SpaceImaging is a failed corporation, and its assets are being sold.
The terms, history, and application of the contract are, themselves, important and complicated
subjects worthy of a separate article. Only its most germane elements will be addressed in this
article. The contract is on file with the author.
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In 1987, three years after the Commercialization Act was passed, it was
amended.3' The amendments signaled the beginning of the end of Landsat
commercialization, which culminated in era three. The Amendments called for
flexibility between the government and the contractor. This was a legislative
manifestation of the ongoing tug-of-war between the public and private sector
combined with a virtually unchanged data market.
The beginning of the end of the monopoly started with the emergence of
Mission to Planet Earth ("MPE")32 as a focal point of national space policy.
MPE was envisioned as a long-term, integrated monitoring system comprised of
satellites and other on-orbit platforms. To prepare for MPE, NASA and NOAA
needed a global data set to calibrate the mission's new sensors. The
Commercialization Act required them to purchase the data from EOSAT who
quoted a price of fifty million dollars. The agencies-sophisticated data users
and political players-knew that the fifty million dollars would merely filter
through the contractor for use of an asset already paid for by taxes. That-and
the fact that the agencies were now faced with the same high prices that other
user groups had experienced for nearly a decade--catalyzed them to lobby for a
change in the law. The stage was set for the Policy Act, which ended era two and
ushered in era three.
2. Statutory Foundation: The Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act and Amendments
Congress found that continuous civilian collection and use of land-remote
sensing data were a "major benefit" in Earth resource management and planning
and conducting economic activities; that public and private land remote sensing
"affects [U.S.] international commitments and policies and national security
concerns . . . ." The private sector was considered "best suited" to develop data
markets, particularly the value-added industry but Congress "doubt[ed]" that the
private sector alone could develop a total system due to the "high risk and large
capital expenditure involved." Federal government and industry cooperation was
necessary but with the "minimum practicable amount of [government] support
and regulation." Data continuity had to be assured to the Federal government
and unreliable data continuity "inhibited" market development. Finally, there

31

The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act Amendments of 1987, 101 Stat at 876.

32

NASA, Leadershi and America's Future in Space 23-25 (Aug 1987). The term "Mission to Planet
Earth" was used in this report, but was changed in name, form and scope over the years. A full
description of these events is beyond the scope of this article; therefore, only the original term,
"Mission to Planet Earth," will be used.
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was "no compelling reason" to commercialize the nation's meteorological
satellites.3 3
Data continuity was a primary goal of the Commercialization Act and it
meant availability for six years from the practical demise of the space segment.
Continuity was to be determined from the user's perspective and had to be the
"functional equivalent" of multispectral data from Landsats 1 and 2. An annual
volume "at least equal to the Federal usage during fiscal year 1983" was
recommended. In order to insure data continuity, a three-phased framework was
designed to move remote sensing activities away from just the Landsat system
into a mixed public-private transition period in which
the government system
34
environment.
commercial,
fully
third,
a
to
gave way
Phase one operation and Landsatdata marketing was divided between DoC
and a private sector contractor. DoC would be responsible for operating
Landsats 1 through 5 and providing data to foreign ground stations under
existing agreements. The primary focus of the first phase was marketing
unenhanced data that was to be carried out by a private contractor. Congress
saw this as the best approach to commercialization and therefore it was
"essential" that marketing make an immediate transition, even if operations did
not. 35 The US Government retained operational decisionmaking authority as well
as tide to the system and raw data.
The marketing contract would be competitively awarded if it were likely to
result in a net cost savings to the government. Its terms had to allow the
contractor to set raw data prices, bind the contractor to the nondiscriminatory
access policy,3 6 and required the contractor to pay fill price to the Federal
government for any data it used other than for selling or authorized research and
development. This addressed Congressional antitrust concerns. Congress wanted
to ensure that if the contractor engaged in value-added activities it would be
unable to receive an advantage over other value-added companies.
The marketing contract allowed the contractor to pay the DoC for system
operating fees and payments as an initial fee or as a percentage of sales receipts.
The contractor could use or change system elements at its own expense. The
most important criterion for contractor selection was the ability to
§ 4201,
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15 USC
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15 USC
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Hearings on the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act at 14, 18 (cited in note 16)
(statement of William P. Bishop, Chairman, Source Evaluation Board for Civil Space Remote
Sensing).
15 USC §5 4271(a)-(b) ("Any unenhanced data generated by any system operator ... shall be
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paras 1-14.
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made available to all users on a non-discriminatory basis .... " "Any system operator shall make
publicly available the prices, policies, procedures, and other terms and conditions (but . . . not
necessarily the names of buyers or their purchases).").
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"aggressively" market raw data.37 Other criteria were the production of the best
financial return to the government; the ability to meet contract terms; technical
competence; and the ability to transfer to a follow-on contractor.
In official relationships with the foreign ground stations, the contractor
would be the Secretary of Commerce's agent and supply data according to the
existing ground station agreements for their duration. When they expired, the
contractor was free to negotiate new agreements and the US Government would
no longer be a party to them. Subsequent agreements had to provide for
nondiscriminatory access and foreign stations could only obtain data from the
contractor.
The second phase of commercialization was designed to ensure data
continuity by an orderly transition from the Landsat system to a new commercial
system, which would be operational before the termination of Landsat 5's useful
life. This phase was intended to cost the United States less money than
continuing Landsat. The phase two contract would provide the development and
operation of a system capable of providing data for six years. Here, the
government would pay for a capability, therefore the contractor would, unlike in
the phase one contract, own all data and hardware. In order to promote
competition, Congress preferred that the phase two contractor be a different
one than the phase one contractor.
Phase two contract proposals had to specify the amount and quality of data
expected; beginning date of operations; number of satellites and expected
lifetimes; whether there was a need for Federal funding; the percentage of rebate
offered to the Federal government; marketing plans; the ability to expand the
market; and, procedures for meeting national security concerns and international
obligations. Additional considerations were the commercial viability of the
proposal; the contractor's technical competence and financial soundness; the
contractor's ability to add capability at its own expense to maintain United States
leadership in remote sensing; and, if a different contractor than the one awarded
the phase one contract, its ability to work with the first contractor. Two
competitions were authorized in the event the first one failed to produce a
contract. If the second competition failed, then DoC was given procurement
authority for a follow-on system subject to appropriations.
The contract itself had to begin immediately after the award was made,
assure data continuity for six years, and provide that unenhanced data would be
offered and sold on a nondiscriminatory basis. It could allow the contractor to
use government civil space assets on a space available basis and at its own
expense for a commercial system. The contract could not contain guaranteed
37

15 USC § 4213; Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 § 203, HR Rep No 98647, 98th Cong, 2d Sess (1984).
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data purchases from the Federal government although the government could
allow loans, loan guarantees, or payments to provide data continuity for six
years. Marketing incentives were available by permitting a sliding scale that
would decrease payments made by the contractor to the government for any
services and hardware provided to it as sales levels increased.
The third, and final, commercialization phase described a fully commercial
environment in which private sector companies would want to develop, launch,
and operate their own remote sensing systems or operate a system that used
government satellites. In order to facilitate this, Congress passed licensing
requirements for these systems.
Any natural or juridical person "subject to the jurisdiction or control" of
the United States had to have a license to operate a private system.38 A potential
licensee had to demonstrate that it could operate a system in compliance with
United States national security concerns and international obligations; make
unenhanced data available on a nondiscriminatory basis; make data available for
national archival purposes; furnish DoC with orbital and data collection
characteristics and, upon termination of the system's life, dispose of the satellites
"in a manner satisfactory to the President."3 9 A licensee must notify the DoC of
any agreements with foreign entities, value-added activities, and plans for
compliance with nondiscriminatory access. It must allow inspection of facilities,
equipment and financial records. If the license application concerned operation
of a government-owned satellite or vehicle, the license also had to provide that
the operator would immediately reimburse the government for related costs and
that operation would not interfere with civilian government missions.
The licensing authority could monitor compliance, determine wrongdoing,
and impose civil penalties. It could grant, terminate, modify, condition, transfer
or suspend a license. In order to determine if the licensee was engaging in
discriminatory sales or withholding data from the archive, the DoC could
conduct investigations, issue subpoenas, inspect equipment, facilities, or
financial records, and seize objects, records or reports. Noncompliance civil
penalties could reach ten thousand dollars for each day of operation in violation
of a license. If action adverse to a licensee's interest was to be taken, the licensee
had a right to a formal agency hearing and adjudication by the Secretary of
Commerce on the record. Agency final actions could be subject to judicial
review.
In the 1987 Amendments, Congress found that "the relationships among
the involved Federal agencies and the private sector have not yet been
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adequately defined."4 ° Congress found further that because "the technical
development and commercial applications of future land remote-sensing systems
cannot now be predicted ... it is in the national interest ... that the ... agencies
and the private sector remain flexible" in carrying out their responsibilities under
the Commercialization Act. 4' The amendments primarily addressed making
unenhanced data more available for research and development purposes. One
change tightened the nonreproduction rights of any system operator by requiring
domestic and foreign purchasers to refrain from disseminating and reproducing
purchased data. The 1987 changes were precursors to the major changes that
came in the third era, five years later.
C. ERA THREE: 1992-2004
1. Synopsis
On October 28, 1992, the Policy Act was passed.4 2 It replaced the
Commercialization Act and switched the legal focus away from
commercialization and toward establishing long-term national policy. The five
most significant changes the law made was returning the Landsatprogram to the
public sector; increasing the emphasis on the environmental value of remote
sensing; reducing Landsat data prices to the cost of filling a user request; formally
establishing the "National Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive"4 3 ; and
decreasing the application of the nondiscriminatory access policy to private
systems by requiring them to only make data available to sensed states. There
were two attempts to amend the Policy Act; both failed to pass prior to
Congress' adjournment. 44 They attempted to extend the Government-EOSAT
contract and add to Landsat 7 baseline funding.
A major characteristic of era three was the constantly changing
membership of the Landsat Management Program ("LPM") that was responsible
for the Landsat program. The LPM initially consisted of NASA and the DoD. It
began to dissolve almost as soon as the Policy Act was passed when NASA and
DoD became involved in a funding dispute over an advanced technology sensor
called the high-resolution multispectral stereo imager. Despite the efforts of
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The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act Amendments of 1987 § 302(3), 101 Stat at
876.
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Id at S (4).
15 USC § 5601-41.
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15 USC § 5652. See also <http://edc.usgs.gov/archive/nsrsda/index.hrnil> (visited Feb 25,
2005).
See HR 4489, 103d Cong, 2d Sess (Oct 5, 1994), in 140 Cong Rec HR 4090 (May 25, 1994);
Landsat Amendments Act of 1995, S Rep No 104-81, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995).
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some in Congress to force NASA and DoD to follow the law,4" they went their
separate ways with DoD leaving the program completely. Eight years later, a
new LPM configuration in which NASA and DoC/NOAA transitioned their
remaining Landsat responsibilities to DoI/USGS was formally approved,
acknowledging the de facto practice that had emerged after the DoD-NASA
46
split.
In tandem with the interagency reorganizations over Landsat 7, a publicprivate battle was raging over its successor. The Policy Act allowed for four
options: a private sector system; another Government system; a public-private
cooperative effort; or establishing an international consortium. In 1999, the
Landsat Data Continuity Mission ("LDCM") was announced and the
competitive process begun. For four years industry-government data policy
workshops were held; two, five-million-dollar, formulation-phase contracts were
awarded; two companies won non-Landsat government contracts worth up to
five-hundred million dollars each and two companies won non-Landsat
government contracts for next generation satellites (one company received one
of each kind and dropped out of the LDCM process altogether); other bidders
reorganized, dropped in and dropped out; until, just as in 1984, a single bidder
remained. The one-to-one struggle became more intense and less public until the
process was terminated in late 2003. Unlike 1984, this time the decision was to
reject the one remaining proposal and to place the LDCM in the Government.
The official reason for eliminating the private sector option was that the
proposals failed to meet a key objective of the RFP, specifically, to form a fair
and equitable partnership. The remaining proposal left the Government with a
disproportionate share of the costs and risks of system development.47 The
official reason was controversial and acceptance of it is far from universal in the
remote sensing community. Some believe that the government simply did not
want to give up the program.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP") eliminated the
Policy Act's option for a public-private partnership due to "the lack of viable
commercial markets for Landsat data. . . ." Citing the need for data continuity,
OSTP announced further that the Government will "transition the Landsat
program from a series of independently planned missions to a sustained
45
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Representative George E. Brown, Jr. to Vice President Albert Gore, Jr. (Jan 31, 1994)
that the Vice President use his authority to prevent the prospect of "two Landsat
(on file with CJIL).
of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, Amendment to
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NASA and the United States Geological Survey, Status of the Landsat Data Continuity Mission
(LDCM) (Mar 18, 2004), available online at <http://ltpwww.gsfc.nasa.gov/bsb/hqvisit/
18MAR2004/Jrons.LDCMstatus.pdf> (visited Feb 19, 2005).
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operational program.. . through incorporation of Landsat-type sensors on ...
NPOESS ....
,,4s
This decision combined with the Presidential decision to
stabilize short-term Landsatprogram funding sets the stage for era four.
2. Statutory Foundation: The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of
1992
Congress found "full commercialization of the Landsat program cannot be
achieved in the near term" and thus dropped commercialization as the near-term
national goal. The importance of remote sensing for "understanding human
impacts on the global environment" and global change research was particularly
noted. Congress found further that the cost of Landsat data "impeded" its use
for scientific purposes. It noted the "success and importance" of the Landsat
system, but also noted that "funding and organizational uncertainties ... have
placed its future in doubt . . . ." Unenhanced data from the privately operated
Landsats 4 through 6 should be made available "at a minimum" to global change
researchers and federal agencies at the cost of fulfilling requests ("COFUR")
while data from the now-publicly operated Landsat 7 is to be available to all users
at COFUR. The policies of nondiscriminatory access and open skies were
reaffirmed. Market development and the commercial value-added industry were
49
identified as "exclusively the function of the private sector.7
Joint management responsibility for the Landsat system was given to the
Landsat LPM, which first consisted of NASA and the DoD. The DoC was to
transfer Landsat 6 program responsibilities to them. The LPM had to develop a
plan that included the "fundamental goal" of Landsat data continuity through
Landsat 7 operations. The plan also had to contain a mutually acceptable
"baseline funding profile" for which NASA and DoD shared "approximately
equal" responsibility. If Landsat 7 was to include improvements "over the ...
functional equivalent" of Landsat 6, any improvements that exceeded the
baseline funding were to be paid for by the agency "sponsoring" them. ° The
LPM had contracting and oversight authority for satellite operations and data
processing and was responsible for the procurement, launch, and operations of
Landsat 7. It had to ensure it would be responsive to civilian, national security,
commercial, and foreign users; that all unenhanced data remained unclassified;
and that it acquire "data of high priority locations" to meet the needs of the
United States Global Change Research Program. It also had to provide copies of
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data to the
national data archives and coordinate the technology demonstration
51
program.
The Policy Act established a Landsat advisory process which was required
to "seek impartial advice and comments" about the system's effectiveness and
operations from a broad range of individuals representing the "full spectrum of
users.". Biennial reports were to be made to Congress containing a report on
public comments and responses; volume of data use, by category; and,
recommendations for programmatic or policies changes.5 2
Regarding Landsat7, the procurement contract's fundamental objective was
to have Landsat 7 operational before the demise of Landsat 6 and to ensure data
continuity with a satellite, which would be the functional equivalent of Landsat 6.
Any changes in cost, delivery, and launch had to be reported to Congress. The
LPM defines what constitutes a United States private sector entity and the
definition had to take into account the entity's location of operations, assets, and
personnel.
The LPM has overall responsibility for coordinating data policy for
Landsats 4 through 6. Its goal is to "provide for a phased transition to a data
policy consistent with Landsat 7 data policy" before the satellite begins
operations. "At a minimum," the phased arrangement should require that raw
data be available to federal government and affiliated users at COFUR provided
that the data is used for noncommercial purposes. "Affiliated users" are federal
agencies; researchers in the US Global Change Research Program and
international counterpart programs; and, any researcher who has signed a
cooperative agreement with the federal government for noncommercial data use.
Data must be made available to the national data archive on the same terms, as
must instructional data sets from the archive for educational institutions. Federal
users and their affiliates may reproduce data for other agencies and affiliated
users. The needs of global environmental change researchers and national
security users must be met. Vouchers or data grants should also be available for
nonprofit, public interest entities at COFUR for noncommercial purposes. Data
from foreign3 ground stations should be available as easily and affordably as
practicable.1
Data contract negotiations between the government and the Landsat 6
contractor had to begin within thirty days of the law's enactment and had to be
concluded a year later. If an agreement was reached, then the LPM had to
submit a certified, joint report to Congress. If an agreement was not reached,
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then the report had to include options and recommendations to achieve the
required goals.5 4 Options had to include retaining the existing or modified
Landsat contract; terminating existing exclusive data contracts; and establishing
an alternative private sector mechanism to market and distribute data.
Landsat 7 data policy set the standard for Landsats 4 through 6 and requires
raw data be available to all users at COFUR. It specifically excludes from
COFUR the costs of the acquisition, amortization or depreciation of the
satellites paid for by the government. The United States retains ownership of the
unenhanced data. Timely and dependable delivery is to be made to civilian,
national security, commercial and foreign users, and the national data archive.
The policy should be supportive of commercial marketing and value-added
activities and must ensure that these remain an exclusively private sector
function. To the extent possible, Landsat 7 data should also be compatible with
EOSDIS. Additionally, the policy may provide for private sector entities to
operate Landsat 7 ground stations and other means of direct access. If this
happens, the government may charge the private entity a per image or licensing
fee.
Regarding private land remote sensing systems, 5 the DoC is the licensing
authority. DoD, DoS and other appropriate agencies have consultation
authority.5 6 Unenhanced data must be made available to the "government of any
country... concerning the territory under its jurisdiction." Special designations
to make data available may be included in the license "if it is in the interest of
the United States . . . after considering the impact on the licensee and the
importance of promoting widespread access to... data from United States and
foreign systems."5 7
In general, research, development, and technology demonstration is to be
the responsibility of the government. NASA is authorized and encouraged to
conduct experimental programs, including applications and basic research at
universities; focus on monitoring the Earth and its environment; and engage in
54
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Negotiations failed and the report was not made. This fact was pivotal in a civil action brought by
the Landsat operator against the government for enforcement of a sole source contract. The
failure to produce the report meant that "the LPM set out on an independent course of action ...
. Only after being ordered to do so by this court did NASA and Commerce present their report to
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cooperative agreements and joint ventures with other agencies, private industry,
universities, nonprofit organizations, state and local governments, foreign
governments, and international organizations. The Departments of Agriculture
and Interior may conduct remote sensing research and development specifically
to manage and utilize renewable and nonrenewable resources. They may engage
in cooperative agreements similar to the ones authorized for NASA. All federal
agencies are similarly encouraged
to conduct research and development
58
consistent with their missions.
By October 28, 1997, the LPM had to report to Congress on a Landsat 7
follow-on system. 9 The report had to include a full assessment of the
advantages and disadvantages of private-sector management and funding;
establishing an international consortium; continued federal responsibility; and, a
public/private partnership. Each option had to be analyzed in terms of its ability
to encourage a system to serve all user interests; maintain data continuity; and, to
incorporate system enhancements
developed under the technology
demonstration program. Preference is to be made for a private sector system if it
is consistent with national interests.
Nondiscriminatory data availability and archiving are considered together.
Any unenhanced data from Landsat or other publicly funded and owned land
remote sensing systems, must be available "without preference, bias, or special
arrangement." Delivery, format, pricing, or technical considerations must not
"favor one customer or class of customers over another." Reduced prices may
be given to federal users and their affiliates for noncommercial purposes.6 0
Data archiving is the responsibility of Dol. It and the LPM must provide
for the long-term storage, maintenance, and upgrading of a basic data set and
procedures for timely access. The data archive as of October 28, 1992 is the
baseline for the basic data set. Requirements of global change research are to be
paid "particular attention." Data generated by the Landsat system, foreign
ground stations, and private licensees, may be included as "appropriate." After
the expiration of exclusionary rights, data must be in the public domain.61
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS LEARNED AND THOUGHTS
ABOUT THE FUTURE
The relevant committees of both the House and the Senate "agreel that
long-term [Landsat] remote sensing data are vital to many aspects of the
58
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government and private sector. '62 This is official recognition that Landsat and its
follow-on, the OLI, is as valuable an asset as the nation's weather satellites. Like
the weather satellites, OLI can't be permitted to become a sacrificial lamb to
other forces like temporary budget lines and interagency rivalries. Moving
forward-and to avoid repeating the problems of the past-this recognition
must be properly institutionalized. Proper institutionalization means fully
integrating OLI as a long-term operational sensor into the NPOESS
infrastructure both organizationally as well as an instrument on an orbiting
platform; 63 keeping OLI data policy consistent with Policy Act requirements;
preparing for a data gap; and keeping the OLI available to become part of an
international consortium.
Integrating the OLI into NPOESS 64 can work. The success of integration
as a management design for interagency satellite activities has been
documented. 65 However, integration must be made beyond the decision level. It
must be established as fact: in physical location, assignments, resources and
authority. OLI integration must also be in policy and intent with a specific
member of the NPOESS Integrated Program Office ("IPO") made responsible
for making it an integral component of the whole system. Adequate authority
and resources that can overcome agency cultural barriers to integration must be
made available to support the responsibility. All of the existing IPO membersNASA, DoD and NOAA-have each been responsible for Landsat at one time
or another and each either declined or failed to champion Landsat as a part of its
own mission. Inadequate responsibility, resources and authority for OLI will
result in a de facto "joint" management structure: relegating it to a parallel set of
procedures without becoming an integrated NPOESS element. The failure of
joint management satellite activities without integrated interests and
requirements has also been documented. A previous attempt to jointly manage
Landsat failed and the joint office was never established.66 This was despite
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Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2005, HR Rep No 108-542,
108th Cong, 2d Sess 57 (2004).
JTA Agreement, art 1(1.2) (cited in note 6) ("As currently planed by the U.S. Government, the
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Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Memorandum (cited
in note 1).
Molly K. Macauley, A Herculean Task? Economics, Poflics, and Reagning Government in the Case of U.S.
Polar-Orbiting Weather Satellites 7 (Resources for the Future 2004), available online at
<http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-04-21.pdf> (visited Feb 27, 2005).
The Landsat Program Management Plan and HR 3614, The National Land Remote-Sensing
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Congressional direction to do so and the participating agencies'
acknowledgement that "continuous coordination in all aspects" was critical for
meeting their joint Landsat responsibilities.6 7
NPOESS data policy is complex and identifies data policy on a sensor-bysensor or a group of sensors basis. 68 As an NPOESS component, OLI data must
remain open and unclassified. The OLI is the Landsat Data Continuity Mission.69
"[A]ny follow-on land remote sensing system operated and owned by the United
States Government, along with any related ground equipment, systems, and
facilities owned by the United States Government"7 is Landsatin law, regardless
of the system's name. Therefore OLI is governed by the Policy Act. OLI will
have to provide data continuity7 1 and "[r]egardless of management
responsibilities for the Landsat program, the Nation's broad civilian, national
security, commercial, and foreign policy interests in remote sensing will best be
served by ensuring that Landsat remains an unclassified program that operates
according to the principles of open skies and nondiscriminatory access. 7 2 OLI
integration into NPOESS must incorporate these principles and ensure that OLI
continues the thirty-three year Landsat heritage by remaining an open, accessible,
civilian system.
As this article goes to press, there is a high probability that there will be a
data gap between the inevitable demise of Landsat 7 and the NPOESS launch
which appears to be moving further out in time. If this happens, preparations
must be made to acquire reasonable data alternatives for the National Satellite
Land Remote Sensing Data Archive, industry, and others who have become
operationally dependent on Landsatdata.
Finally, OLI must be seen in terms of its future generations. In addition to
NPOESS, large and small nations and satellite operating organizations are
coordinating their Earth observations satellites and activities in a variety of
multilateral arrangements and consortia. They include the further coordination
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the Global Change Research Act of 1990 and coordinating a remote sensing technology
demonstration program.
Id at 13. Congress directed the Landsat Coordinating Group, consisting of representatives from
the Department of Defense and NASA, to be a "joint" organization and to be "jointly chaired
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of NPOESS with the European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites as part of an Initial Joint Polar-orbiting Operational
Satellite System;73 the Global Monitoring of Environment and Security joint
initiative of the European Commission and the European Space Agency;74 an
international Disaster Monitoring Constellation consortium among the UK,
China, Algeria, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam;75 and the Group on Earth
76
Observations consisting of fifty-three nations and the European Commission.
These events are manifesting ideas that have been held for decades by scientists
and policymakers. They face significant organizational challenges.77 However,
historic progress is being made: developing nations have become satellite
operating nations and have joined consortia; the Group on Earth Observations
just made the transition from an ad hoc to a permanent organization and
adopted a ten-year implementation plan for its "system of systems., 78 These
activities demonstrate that the future of a large part of Earth observations is in
multilateral arrangements that include both the space and ground segments. The
Policy Act identifies the option of "establishing an international consortium for
the funding and management of a successor land remote sensing system .... ")79
Integrating the OLI into NPOESS is consistent with this option and sets the
stage for United States participation in the on-going evolution of a permanent
international, civilian land-imaging consortium.
Clearly, it is far too early to predict how US space-based land imaging will
proceed from here. However, if the new approach of integrating a Landsatheritage imager on an operational platform is combined with the lessons learned
over the last three decades, a stable, long-term, open, national civilian land
imaging capability is the closest to reality it has ever been. Our heroine may
never need to be rescued from the figurative railroad tracks again. Like moviegoers in the silent film era, long-term Landsat observers may come to miss the
drama. But for our heroine, she just might be free to go on to her next starring
role.
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